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Background. Aiming to align provider incentives toward improving quality and effi-
ciency, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is considering broader bundling
of hospital and physician payments around episodes of inpatient surgery. Decisions
about bundled payments would benefit from better information about how payments
are currently distributed among providers of different perioperative services and how
payments vary across hospitals.
Study Design. Using the national Medicare database, we identified patients under-
going one of four inpatient procedures in 2005 (coronary artery bypass [CABG], hip
fracture repair, back surgery, and colectomy). For each procedure, price-standardized
Medicare payments from the date of admission for the index procedure to 30 days
postdischarge were assessed and categorized by payment type (hospital, physician, and
postacute care) and subtype.
Results. Average total payments for inpatient surgery episodes varied from
U.S.$26,515 for back surgery to U.S.$45,358 for CABG. Hospital payments accounted
for the largest share of total payments (60–80 percent, depending on procedure), fol-
lowed by physician payments (13–19 percent) and postacute care (7–27 percent). Overall
episode payments for hospitals in the lowest and highest payment quartiles differed by
U.S.$16,668 for CABG, U.S.$18,762 for back surgery, U.S.$10,615 for hip fracture
repair, and U.S.$12,988 for colectomy. Payments to hospitals accounted for the largest
share of variation in payments. Among specific types of payments, those associated with
30-day readmissions and postacute care varied most substantially across hospitals.
Conclusions. Fully bundled payments for inpatient surgical episodes would need to
be dispersed among many different types of providers. Hospital payments——both over-
all and for specific services——vary considerably and might be reduced by incentives for
hospitals and physicians to improve quality and efficiency.
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Efforts to curb the growth of health care spending in the United States, widely
considered a national priority, will inevitably involve surgery. Extrapolating




from our analyses of national Medicare data, costs related to procedures and
other aspects of surgical care consume approximately 40 percent of all hospital
and physician spending, or about U.S.$500 billion annually. Constraining
growth in surgery costs will ultimately depend on slowing the growth in the
number of procedures performed——over 45 million are performed annually in
the United States (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/insurg.htm). Controlling
prices——payments per procedure——will also be essential. Toward this end, the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has recommended
broader bundling of payments for surgical episodes, lumping reimbursements
to hospitals, physicians, and other providers involved in care around a surgical
episode into a single payment (Hackbarth, Reischauer, and Mutti 2008; Med-
PAC 2009). The primary motivation underlying bundled payments is to align
the often conflicting financial incentives of hospitals and surgeons around the
common goal of coordinating care and improving quality and cost-efficiency.
Although conceptually straightforward, implementing this new reim-
bursement policy at the local level may be complex. Payments around in-
patient surgery episodes are currently distributed among a diverse group of
providers for a wide range of services. Some types of payments, including
hospital payments for the index procedures (based on DRG assignments) and
fees for surgeons and anesthesiologists, are obvious. The contributions of other
types of payments, often for more discretionary services, may be under-
appreciated, however. On the hospital side, these include outlier payments
(for patients with particularly expensive hospital courses) and those related to
readmissions for surgical complications. Postacute care, including both home
health care and use of extended care facilities, may also contribute substan-
tially to the overall cost of inpatient surgery.
A fuller accounting of current payments around surgical episodes would
help inform the debate around bundled payments. On behalf of MedPAC
Hackbarth, Reischauer, and Mutti (2008) described Medicare payments
around hospitalizations for three common conditions and the extent to which
payments vary across U.S. hospitals. However, this analysis focused only one
type of surgical admission——coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG). It also
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considered only variation in payments among patients with the same DRG
assignment and thus ignored variation in spending associated with hospital-
level differences in how patients undergoing the same procedure are assigned
to different DRG levels. Although variation in DRG distributions no doubt
reflect differences in hospital case mix and procedure complexity, it may also
occur as a result of different rates of postoperative complications or coding
practices, both potentially leveraged by bundled payments.
In this context, we used national Medicare claims to examine payments
around four expensive procedures performed commonly on the elderly. In
addition to providing a more detailed description of how payments are cur-




This study was based on complete Medicare claims data for a sample of
patients undergoing selected inpatient procedures in 2005. Because services
provided to Medicare managed care patients are not consistently captured in
claims files, such patients (approximately 16 percent in 2005) were excluded
from our study. We also excluded patients less than 65 years of age or over 99
and those not enrolled in both Medicare parts A and B at the time of their
procedures (approximately 4 percent). Finally, to avoid skewing our account-
ing of payments for postacute care, we excluded the small percentage (o1
percent) of patients who were nursing home residents before surgery.
Patients undergoing surgery were identified from the inpatient file based
on the presence of the appropriate procedure codes from the International
Classification of Diseases, version 9. We then identified the subset of these pa-
tients represented in the 20 percent carrier (i.e., physician) files. (Given the
large size of these files, CMS only releases random samples of this database.)
We then linked these patients’ records to other CMS files containing claims
potentially relevant to the surgical episode, including the outpatient, home
health, skilled nursing facility, long stay hospital, and durable medical equip-
ment files. Although this study was based entirely on patients undergoing
surgery in 2005, we used information from January 2006 for patients under-
going surgery in December 2005.
This study was based on patients undergoing the following procedures:
CABG, hip fracture repair, back surgery (including discectomy, laminectomy,
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and fusion), and colectomy. These procedures were selected because they are
common in the elderly, very expensive, and likely to be associated with sub-
stantial costs related to discretionary peri- and postoperative services. Thus,
they are the types of procedures likely to be selected by MedPAC or other
policy makers for episode-based payment bundling. To enhance the homo-
geneity of our study cohorts, patients undergoing contemporaneous valve
replacement were excluded from the CABG cohort. For similar reasons, the
colectomy sample was restricted to patients with codes indicating colon can-
cer, the most common indication for this procedure.
Determination of Payments
For each patient, we assessed actual Medicare payments, not submitted
charges. We extracted payment information for all services types from the
date of hospital admission for the index procedure, to 30 days from the hos-
pital discharge date. Although somewhat arbitrary, this payment window co-
incides with MedPAC’s recommendations. It is also reasonable on empirical
grounds. Based on our analyses, total payments drop to near patients’ pre-
operative baselines by approximately 4–6 weeks after most inpatient proce-
dures. All payments were price-standardized using methods described by
Gottlieb et al. (2010).
In assessing hospital payments, we examined those related to both the
index hospitalization (DRG payment plus outlier payments when present) and
readmissions occurring within 30 days of discharge. In assessing DRG pay-
ments, we used the Medicare Price Amount, which reflects the actual hospital
payment amount plus any applicable patient liability amounts. Pass-through
amounts, used by CMS to cover certain capital expenses, education costs, and
bad debt, were extremely small for the large majority of hospitals and were not
included.
Physician payments were categorized according to the nature of the
service provided, not the specialty type of the physician providing it. Thus,
surgeon and anesthesia payments were extracted from claims containing
current procedural terminology (CPT) codes corresponding to the index pro-
cedure and anesthetic services, respectively. Physician payments for imaging
and laboratory services were assigned based on the presence of CPT codes
specific to those services, as defined by the Berenson–Eggers Type of Service
codes (http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hcpcsreleasecodesets/20_betos.asp). Pay-
ments for all other physician services——inpatient and outpatient——were col-
lapsed under ‘‘other medical.’’
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In assessing costs related to postacute care, payments related to home
health care and outpatient care were obtained directly from those respective
files. We used the DRG price amount in assigning payments for stays in
rehabilitation hospitals, prorated to include only payments occurring within
our 30-day window. Payments to skilled nursing facilities and nursing homes
were determined based on per diem payments occurring within the same time
window.
Finally, we examined variation in payments across hospitals. We ranked
hospitals from lowest to highest in price-standardized payments for overall
payments and again for each type of service. Adopting the same convention as
Hackbarth and colleagues, we then compared average payments between
hospitals in the lowest and highest payment quartiles, respectively. To min-
imize chance variation, we limited this analysis to hospitals with at least 10
cases of each type of procedure.
This study was judged exempt from human subject review by the
Institutional Review Board of the University of Michigan.
RESULTS
Average total payments around inpatient surgery episodes varied from
U.S.$26,515 for back surgery to U.S.$45,358 for CABG. Hospital payments
accounted for the largest share of total payments for each procedure, from 60
percent with hip fracture repair to 80 percent with CABG. Physician payments
accounted for 13–19 percent, depending on procedure. Payments for post-
acute care varied most widely, from only 7 percent with CABG to 27 percent
with hip fracture repair.
As expected, DRG payments were the single largest component of both
hospital and overall payments around surgical episodes (Table 1). A substan-
tial proportion (14–32 percent) of patients undergoing the four procedures was
readmitted with 30 days of discharge from the index admission. For this rea-
son, readmissions accounted for a substantial percentage of overall payments,
ranging from 6.1 percent for colectomy (U.S.$12,023 per readmission, aver-
age U.S.$1,740 for all patients) to 16.2 percent for hip fracture repair
(U.S.$14,073 per readmission, average U.S.$4,454 for all patients).
Of total payments around surgical episodes, only 4–13 percent
(U.S.$1,248 for hip fracture repair to U.S.$3,466 for back surgery) went to
the operating surgeon and less than 3 percent to anesthesiologists (Table 2).
Physician payments for laboratory and imaging services accounted for less
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than 2 percent of total payments. Physician payments for other medical care,
including inpatient consultative services, accounted for between 2.9 percent
and 6.3 percent of total payments.
Payments for postacute care varied widely, ranging from U.S.$2,431
(colectomy) to U.S.$7,585 (hip fracture repair) (Table 3). Between 29 percent
and 50 percent of patients undergoing the four procedures received home
health care afterward, adding U.S.$388–718 to the average bill. Average pay-
ments to skilled nursing facilities were of comparable magnitude for most
procedures, but particularly high for hip fracture repair (U.S.$5,219 per
patient overall).
Overall episode payments between hospitals in the lowest and highest
payment quartiles differed by U.S.$16,668 for CABG, U.S.$18,762 for back











DRG payment for index hospitalization
% with payment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
31,329 15,487 11,844 19,484
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 31,329 15,487 11,844 19,484
% hospital payments/% total
payments
86.9/69.1 81.8/58.4 71.9/43.0 88.9/68.7
Outliers
% with payment 7.1 4.7 1.5 3.9
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
22,084 16,632 11,430 17,984
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 1,559 783 168 696
% hospital payments/% total
payments
4.3/3.4 4.1/3.0 1.0/0.6 3.2/2.5
30-day readmissions
% with payment 23.4 18.6 31.7 14.5
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
13,526 14,294 14,073 12,023
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 3,162 2,658 4,454 1,740
% hospital payments/% total
payments
8.8/7.0 14.0/10.0 27.0/16.2 7.9/6.1
Total
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 36,049 18,928 16,467 21,920
% total payments 79.5 71.4 59.7 77.3
Based on 2005 National Medicare claims.
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% with payment 98.8 97.0 96.8 97.5
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
2,743 3,466 1,248 1,551
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 2,712 3,364 1,208 1,512
% physician payments/% total
payments
44.0/6.0 67.5/12.7 34.3/4.4 37.8/5.3
Anesthesia
% with payment 97.2 97.0 97.4 97.2
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
975 712 392 505
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 948 690 382 491
% physician payments/% total
payments
15.4/2.1 13.8/2.6 10.9/1.4 12.3/1.7
Imaging
% with payment 98.9 91.4 99.2 78.7
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
361 131 152 265
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 357 120 150 209
% physician payments/% total
payments
5.8/0.8 2.4/0.5 4.3/0.5 5.2/0.7
Laboratory
% with payment 93.0 63.6 82.8 98.4
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
105 75 57 286
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 98 48 47 282
% physician payments/% total
payments
1.6/0.2 1.0/0.2 1.3/0.2 7.0/1.0
Other medical
% with payment 99.3 83.3 99.7 95.3
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
2,056 915 1,736 1,581
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 2,042 762 1,731 1,508
% physician payments/% total
payments
33.2/4.5 15.3/2.9 49.2/6.3 37.7/5.3
Total
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 6,157 4,985 3,518 4,001
% total payments 13.6 18.8 12.8 14.1
Based on 2005 National Medicare claims.
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% with payment 56.1 33.7 40.8 43.4
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
426 235 418 414
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 239 79 171 180
% postacute care payments/% total
payments
7.6/0.5 3.0/0.3 2.2/0.6 7.4/0.6
Home health
% with payment 50.4 28.8 33.0 29.2
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
1,425 1,728 1,526 1,331
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 718 498 504 388
% postacute care payments/% total
payments
22.8/1.6 19.1/1.9 6.6/1.8 16.0/1.4
Skilled nursing
% with payment 17.5 15.6 69.5 21.8
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
5,323 5,331 7,510 5,625
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 931 829 5,219 1,227
% postacute care payments/% total
payments
29.5/2.1 31.9/3.1 68.9/18.9 50.5/4.3
Rehabilitation
% with payment 2.9 5.5 8.1 0.8
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
13,190 13,165 14,887 15,423
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 380 727 1,203 120
% postacute care payments/% total
payments
12.1/0.8 27.9/2.7 15.9/4.4 4.9/0.4
Nursing homes
% with payment 2.6 0.8 1.7 1.4
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
31,572 25,751 23,215 29,142
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 814 195 396 406
% postacute care/% total
payments
25.8/1.8 7.5/0.7 5.2/1.4 16.7/1.4
Hospice
% with payment 0.2 0.2 1.7 1.6
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
878 1,301 1,381 2,068
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 1 2 24 34
% postacute care/% total payments 0.0/0.0 0.1/0.0 0.3/0.1 1.4/0.1
continued
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surgery, U.S.$10,615 for hip fracture repair, and U.S.$12,988 for colectomy
(Figure 1). With the exception of hip fracture repair (which is associated with a
single DRG level), differences in DRG assignment and thus payments related
to the index hospitalization accounted for the single largest share of variation
in payments. Differences in payments for readmissions accounted for at least
U.S.$3,000 in average payments between the lowest and highest cost hospi-
tals. Differences in payments for physician services and postacute care were
substantial but accounted for a smaller proportion of variation in average
payments across hospitals.
DISCUSSION
Although hospitals have long received a fixed amount for a given hospital
admission (based on DRG assignment), this mechanism alone provides in-
adequate incentives for improving quality and cost-efficiency with inpatient
surgery. Hospitals pay little penalty for poor quality, as patients with adverse
outcomes get ‘‘bumped up’’ to higher paying DRGs or trigger outlier pay-
ments. Costs associated with adverse outcomes get shifted to settings for which
payments are not bundled, such as readmissions and postacute care. Finally,
the current prospective payment system fails to align incentives between hos-
pitals and their physicians, who continue to be paid for each unit of service and
remain largely shielded from the financial consequences of their quality of












% with payment 29.7 40.5 34.7 25.3
Average payment, when present
(U.S.$)
229 671 201 303
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 68 272 70 77
% post-acute care/% total
payments
2.2/0.1 10.4/1.0 0.9/0.3 3.2/0.3
Subtotal for postacute care
Average payment, overall (U.S.$) 3,152 2,602 7,585 2,431
% total payments 6.9 9.8 27.5 8.6
Based on 2005 National Medicare claims.
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hospitals, surgeons, and all other providers involved in treating patients during
and after inpatient surgery would share a single lump sum payment. All would
have ‘‘skin the game,’’ sharing in the higher margins associated with unevent-
ful, cost-efficient surgical care (Dimick et al. 2006), but suffering financially
from poor outcomes and excess utilization.
Bundled payments around inpatient surgery are not a brand new idea.
Over 25 years ago, the Texas Heart Institute began charging a single lump sum
for CABG (Miller 2009). Geisinger Health System followed suit in 2007, re-
ceiving considerable media attention (Abelson 2007). For organ transplanta-
tion, similar ‘‘case rate’’ payments have been common among private payers
for several years. In 2008, the MedPAC made several recommendations
aimed a charting a path toward broader implementation of bundled payments
around hospital episodes, including surgical admissions (Hackbarth, Re-
ischauer, and Mutti 2008). These include providing hospitals and physicians
with relevant information about how their cost per episodes compare with
those of their peers. Second, MedPAC recommended that payments be re-
duced for hospitals with high risk-adjusted readmission rates for selection
Figure 1: Differences in Price-Adjusted Medicare Payments around Episodes
of Four Different Types of Inpatient Procedures between Hospitals in the
Lowest and Highest Quartiles of Overall Payments. Based on 2005
National Medicare Data
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conditions. Finally, it recommended that Congress initiate a pilot test of bun-
dled payments for a small number of conditions involving hospitalization,
which is now underway.
The results of our study suggest several types of payments associated
with inpatient surgery that might be leveraged by bundled payments. Hospital
payments not only accounted for the largest share of overall payments but also
comprised the largest source of variation in payments across hospitals. Vari-
ation associated with payments for index hospitalization, outliers, and 30-day
readmissions were considerable for each of the four procedures studied. To
the extent that such payments are strongly associated with patients with ad-
verse outcomes and hospital quality (Baser et al. 2009), bundled payments
should provide strong incentives toward quality improvement. Echoing the
results of the MedPAC analysis, payments for postacute care were substantial
and varied widely across hospitals. Such payments would be reduced by in-
centives for both minimizing postoperative complications and avoiding the
use of home health care and extended care facilities in patients who do not
truly require them.
Although our analysis identifies areas of variation and services requiring
further scrutiny, it does not identify how much savings might be achieved by
episode-based bundled payments for inpatient surgery. Because hospital-spe-
cific sample sizes were limited, hospital payments——both overall and for spe-
cific types of payments——will vary by chance alone. Because claims data
provided limited clinical detail for risk adjustment, some of the variation in
hospital payments observed in this analysis are no doubt attributable to
differences in case mix. Finally, we made no attempt to link payment levels
to patient outcomes. Thus, we can make no inference about the extent to
which variation in hospital payments reflects underuse or overuse of specific
services.
Implementation of bundled payments will be associated with numerous
challenges. In addition to contentiousness around how bundled payments are
divvied up among the many providers involved in a surgical episode, there
will be considerable gray area in determining which services go in the bundle.
For example, readmission for a complication unambiguously related to the
operation (e.g., surgical site infection) would clearly be bundled. But what
about patients readmitted 3 weeks after CABG with pneumonia or congestive
heart failure, conditions that might have occurred in the absence of surgery?
Second, bundled payments may provide incentives for hospitals and provid-
ers to skimp on necessary care, for example, home health care in patients who
really need it. Hospitals could minimize investments in resources associated
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with safer surgery (e.g., quality and quantity of nursing staffing, intensivist-
managed ICUs) or better long-term outcomes (e.g., more expensive but su-
perior joint prostheses) (Aiken et al. 2002; Pronovost et al. 2002). The need for
safeguards against such unintended consequences is widely recognized, but
whether existing quality measures and monitoring systems are sufficient for
this task remains a matter of debate.
As efforts to bundle payments for surgical episodes gain momentum,
hospitals and physicians should be prepared. Hospitals should implement
better systems for monitoring, benchmarking, and improving their quality and
cost-efficiency with inpatient surgery. Physicians, the primary drivers of uti-
lization, should redouble their efforts to eliminate clinical waste——practices
that generate additional expense at little value to patients. Hospitals and phy-
sicians will need to collaborate on strategies for enhancing care coordination
as surgical patients leave the hospital. For their part, payers and policy makers
will need to recognize that improving technical quality and cost-efficiency with
inpatient surgery is only a start. More ‘‘upstream’’ strategies aimed at reducing
unwanted variation in the use of surgery will also be essential in improving
outcomes and controlling costs with surgical care.
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